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Introduction
How will the result of the 16th Nation-
al Congress of the Communist Party of China 
("16th National Congress of the CPC") affect 
China's foreign policy? Will the "Three Rep-
resents" that was recently added to the party 
rules bring about any change in foreign pol-
icy? How will the newly elected party leader-
ship be involved in policy-making and what 
kind of policy will they adopt?
This chapter will examine these ques-
tions from three angles. First, we look into 
continuity of foreign policy from the for-
mer administration. What did the Jiang Zem-
in administration inherit from the former ad-
ministration and what will they leave to the 
next generation? We will discuss the mean-
ing of the "16-word Directive," a policy Deng 
Xiaoping designed. Next, we will examine the 
changes in the attitudes toward foreign coun-
tries. How has foreign policy changed since 
Deng Xiaoping's death in February 1997? We 
will study the features of the foreign policy of 
the Jiang Zemin administration from the 15th 
National Congress in September 1997 to pres-
ent. Last, we will consider the foreign policy 
of the new leadership elected at the 16th Na-
tional Congress of the CPC; will the new lead-
ership contine or change Jiang's policies? At 
the time of writing, the new administration 
has not been established; thus, the term "new 
leadership" refers to the party leadership. 
Although the National People's Con-
gress is held every year in March, the upcom-
ing meeting immediately after the CPC Na-
tional Congress will have special signifi cance, 
as the new government leadership will have 
been decided by that time. Refl ecting the re-
shuffl e of the party leadership, the govern-
ment will probably try to rejuvenate the struc-
ture and promote specialization of each 
function. It will also become clearer wheth-
er Jiang Zemin will retire from politics com-
pletely. Although he retired from the top par-
ty post of General Secretary, he still occupies 
of the CPC Central Military Commission, the 
supreme commander of the military forces. It 
is important to consider how his retirement 
or semi-retirement will affect foreign policy.
3.1 The Formulation of the "16-word 
Directive"
On September 4 ,  1989 ,  just three 
months after the Tiananmen Incident, Deng 
Xiaoping discussed international affairs with 
"some responsible persons of the central gov-
ernment" (Deng [1995, 324]). Deng's idea-
which later became known as the "16-word 
Directive"-was imparted during this discus-
sion. The idea was written in 12 Chinese char-
acters meaning "observe calmly, stand fi rmly, 
respond carefully" (Deng [1993, 321]). How-
ever, the Directive currently referred to in of-
fi cial documents is written in 16 characters 
(Liu [2002, 11]). Thus, there is a discrepancy 
in the numbers of the words. The eight char-
acters not used in the discussion mean "hide 
one's ability to buy time and do whatever nec-
essary."
Even today, 13 years after the Tianan-
men Incident, the 16-word Directive is a core 
foreign policy of China. Liu Huaqiu, Direc-
tor of Central Offi ce of the Central Leading 
Group for Foreign Affairs and Director of the 
Foreign Affairs Offi ce of the State Council, 
said, "China must adhere to the 16-word Di-
rective in order to pursue peaceful diplomacy 
independently by correctly grasping complex 
international politics and economic situations 
(Liu [2002, 11])". General Secretary of the 
CPC, Jiang Zemin has followed the policy set 
by Deng Xiaoping immediately after the Ti-
ananmen Incident.
What were the practical outcomes of 
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this guideline? They were as follows:
3.1.1 Deng Xiaoping's infl uence over 
foreign policy
On September 4, 1989, the same day as 
the discussion mentioned above, Deng Xiaop-
ing resigned as Chairman of the Central Mil-
itary Commission and recommended Jiang 
Zemin as his successor. Although Jiang Zem-
in had no military experience, Deng Xiaop-
ing did not seem to mind. What Deng wanted 
most for his successor was obedience to the 
party leadership, because "the military forces 
should always be under the party leadership; 
the recent uprising made it clearer that this 
principle is right." Deng added, "In our tra-
dition, the military forces follow the party or-
ders, form no small groups or factions, and al-
low no centralization of power in a few hands 
(Deng [1995, 321])". With no power in the 
military forces and not known in the political 
center, Jiang Zemin exactly met such require-
ments. However, when Deng Xiaoping retired 
from the Central Military Commission, he en-
sured that his reliable aides became members 
of the commission. Deng's comrade since the 
days of the revolution, Yang Shangkun, as-
sumed the post of First Vice-President; Liu 
Huaqing, Vice-President; as Yang Baibing, 
Yang's half brother, Secretary General.
Although he handed over the top mili-
tary post to Jiang and retired from all offi cial 
posts, Deng remained in the front line of for-
eign affairs. Thus, the 16-word Directive was 
actually implemented by old party leaders, 
and Deng in particular, not by Jiang Zemin. 
According to unoffi cial sources, the Political 
Bureau made a regulation that any important 
policy must be consulted with Deng Xiaop-
ing. In any case, Deng worked hard to break 
the sanctions the West was enforcing against 
China after the Tiananmen Incident. In No-
vember 1989, when he personally met a del-
egation of Japanese business groups, Deng 
emphasized that China would not change its 
reform and openness policy for a foreseeable 
future. In December in the same year, he also 
met Scowcroft of the National Security Coun-
cil sent by then President Bush, and clearly 
expressed his intention to improve relations 
between China and the U.S. Deng is said to 
have asked Scowcroft to deliver his person-
al message to Bush, "One old Chinese retired 
man in the east wishes for the better of China-
U.S. relations" (Chen, Lin et al. [1999, 684]).
3.1.2 Continuity of the Foreign Policy 
Making Bodies
In 1984, when Doak Barnett had the op-
portunity to meet then Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
he had a rare glimpse of the Chinese system 
of foreign policy-making. Generally speak-
ing, in most countries the authority of foreign 
policies is centralized. China has, Barnett ob-
served, perhaps one of the most centralized 
systems. He explained that since the 12th Na-
tional Congress of the CPC in 1982, the poli-
cy-making body for important issues was shift-
ed from the Political Bureau and the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau, to the 
Secretariat of the CPC and the State Coun-
cil (Barnett [1986, 24]). During the meeting 
with Barnett, Zhao said, "Ultimately, we seek 
guidance from Deng Xiaoping."
Although we can trace the policy-mak-
ing process concerning the Tiananmen In-
cident by referring to unoffi cial documents 
(Nathan and Link [2001]), we do not know 
much about the policy-making structure after 
the incident. From offi cial data, however, we 
can draw a rough sketch as follows:
(1) Wen Jiabao remained as Director of the 
CPC Secretariat (General Offi ce). His 
meeting with the students together with 
Zhao at Tiananmen Square, however, may 
have damaged his credibility. Two out of 
three deputy directors of the Secretari-
at remained, and the remaining position 
was fi lled by Jiang Zemin's right-hand man, 
Zeng Qinghong, when Jiang took offi ce as 
General Secretary. Wang Gang, who was lat-
er elected as the sole alternate member of 
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the Political Bureau at the 16th National 
Congress of the CPC, was then appointed 
as Deputy Director.
(2) Qian Qichen kept his post of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs after the Tiananmen Inci-
dent, as did two vice ministers out of fi ve. 
However, four people in a similar rank to 
Vice-Minister were replaced by 1991. Liu 
Huaqiu, was appointed Vice-Minister in Oc-
tober 1989, and in 1991 both Xu Dunx-
in who later became ambassador to Japan 
and Jiang Enzhu who later became the Di-
rector of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Offi ce, were appointed as Vice-Minister. 
Similar changes took place in the assistant 
minister posts; three out of four assistant 
ministers were replaced by 1992. The posts 
were taken by Li Zhaoxing who was lat-
er appointed ambassador to the U.S., Dai 
Bingguo who became Head of the Interna-
tional Liaison Department, and Tang Jiaxu-
an who climbed to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
(3) Until recently, it was not confi rmed that 
the central body of the CPC has an organ 
called the "Central Leading small Group 
for Foreign Affairs". Although it is not yet 
clear how they are involved in actual poli-
cy-making, the composition of this group 
in late 1989, is very interesting. The group 
leader is Premier Li Peng. There are two 
subleaders: the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Wu Xueqian, and the incumbent 
minister, Qian Qichen. If this group is an 
active organization, not a nominal one, that 
performs the policy-making function, then 
it embodies the "continuity" and "central-
ization" of China's foreign policy-making. 
In 1989, Jiang Zemin is not involved in this 
group yet.
(4) In key party organizations, the structure 
before the incident remained. The post 
in charge of the CPC personnel, Head of 
the Organization Department, was kept by 
Song Ping who was valued by Deng. Wang 
Renzhi remained at his post of Head of the 
Publicity Department, as did Zhu Liang 
as Head of the International Liaison De-
partment. Regarding continuity, the career 
path of Ding Guangen, one of Deng's aides, 
is interesting. Before the incident, Ding was 
Vice-Minister of the State Planning Com-
mission; in 1990 he was appointed Head 
of the United Front Work Department; in 
1992 he became Head of the Publicity De-
partment, where he has remained for 10 
years. Although Lu Dingyi, who was re-
moved during the Cultural Revolution, had 
occupied the post for 12 years, his succes-
sors normally moved to other positions in 
two to three years. Compared with these 
predecessors, Ding's long tenure is very un-
usual.
3.1.3 Larger weight of economy
It was Deng Xiaoping himself who se-
lected Zhu Rongji as Vice-Premier of the 
State Council in April 1991, who was then just 
one of the Alternate Members of the Central 
Committee. The State Council at that time 
consisted of Li Peng as Premier, Yao Yilin, 
Tian Jiyun and Wu Xueqian as Vice-Premiers, 
and Luo Gan as Secretary General of the Gen-
eral Offi ce. All of them had been in offi ce 
since before the Tiananmen Incident. Subse-
quently, Zhu Rongji and Zou Jiahua joined as 
Vice-Premiers. Zou was a Central Committee 
Member and it is said that he has taken over 
military industry department which used to 
be under control of Zhou Enlai. Once he be-
came one of the members of the State Coun-
cil, Zhu worked boldly on many economic is-
sues. Without doubt, he was backed by Deng 
Xiaoping who asserted that Zhu understood 
the economy.
Zhu Rongji established his leadership in 
the economic fi eld at the 14th National Con-
gress of the CPC held in October 1992. In this 
National Congress, he was promoted direct-
ly to Standing Committee Member of the Po-
litical Bureau, skipping the two ranks of Cen-
tral Committee Member and Political Bureau 
Member. Zhu ranked number 5 after Jiang 
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Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan. 
He became the First Vice-Premier directly un-
der Li Peng and was able to take drastic mea-
sures in economic policies. Deng Xiaoping's 
so-called the Southern Tour in January 1991 
helped Zhu's rise. Being greatly unhappy with 
the economic operations by Jiang Zemin and 
Li Peng, Deng Xiaoping visited for himself 
the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong 
province and praised the active introduction 
of foreign capital in China. Deng decleared, 
"Without implementing reforms and open 
policy, nothing but death is in store for us. 
Cadres who don't understand this must re-
place their brains with better ones." In re-
sponse to this infl ammatory appeal made by 
the "retired elder", the Party Center and State 
Council urgently made an upward revision of 
their economic goal. Jiang Zemin's political 
report clearly stated that China's goal was to 
establish a "Socialist Market Economy" (Chen, 
Lin, et al. [1999, 775]). China, for the fi rst 
time, offi cially approved of the market econ-
omy. Although the 14th National Congress of 
the CPC was hosted by General Secretary Ji-
ang Zemin, the personnel focus was on the 
rise of Zhu Rongji and the economic focus 
was on the Socialist Market Economy. Conse-
quently, this National Congress represented 
largely the Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping 
instead of the new party leader, Jiang Zemin. 
(see Table 1 for the historical characteristics 
and main issues of the National Congresses).
What was the foreign policy of China in 
the age of the Socialist Market Economy? At 
the time of the 14th National Congress of the 
CPC, the critical situation that followed the 
Tiananmen Incident was already a thing of 
the past. The economic sanctions imposed on 
China virtually disappeared and foreign in-
vestment started fl owing in after the Southern 
Tour. The world's attention, which had once 
been intensively focused on the Tiananmen 
Incident, turned to a series of other historical 
incidents, including the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the Gulf War, and the collapse of East 
European Communist Block and the USSR. 
China endured and did not collapse as the 
USSR had, despite the expectations of some 
observers. Chinese leaders came to realize 
that Deng's 16-word Directive was extremely 
effective.
Foreign minister Qian Qichen, who was 
concurrently State Councilor, outlined Chi-
na's foreign policy at the Central Party School 
in September 1992. In his lecture, Qian fi rst 
pointed out the "objective reality" of the slug-
gishness of socialism and the rise of Amer-
ica as the "only superpower" (Nakai [1997, 
35-36]). Under these circumstances, Chi-
na could overcome the "crisis of system" with 
the 16-word Directive mentioned above. Qian 
also pointed out that the collapse of the Cold 
War structure brought advantages to China in 
international affaires. According to him, the 
advantages to China in the international are-
na were the extinction of the threat from the 
north due to the collapse of the USSR, the de-
cline of Gorbachev's infl uence, and that Chi-
na gave the impression to the world that it was 
stable and impervious to sanctions. Based on 
this assessment, Qian proposed the following 
three directions for the future foreign policy 
of China:
(1) To pursue "Omni directional diplomacy." 
Such a policy sould be free from ideology 
to avoid the "crisis of system":
Specifi c policies include cooperative relations 
with the U.S., good-neighbor and amica-
ble relations with neighboring countries in-
cluding Japan, and the re-establishment of 
diplomatic ties with as many countries as 
possible.
(2) To build a friendly external environment 
for economic development:
Specifi c policies include participation in inter-
national cooperation activities in relation 
to the post-Gulf War, nuclear non-prolifer-
ation, the embargo on weapons and peace-
keeping operations, taking part in region-
al organizations such as APEC and ASEAN, 
and opening the huge Chinese market to 
foreign countries.
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(3) To keep a trilateral balance among China, 
the U.S. and Japan:
?  Specifi c policies are to focus on the U.S. 
as the main target of diplomacy for the 
time being, to avail of inconsistencies in 
the Japan-U.S. relationship for building re-
lations between China and the U.S., to ad-
just relations with Russia, Europe and Asia-
Pacifi c countries in order to restrain the 
trilateral relation between China, the U.S. 
and Japan, to maintain restraining factors 
against both Japan and the U.S., to open 
the Chinese market to the U.S. while taking 
advantage of the war liability issue with Ja-
pan (Nakai [1997, 40-41]).
China took the directions proposed by 
Qian throughout the 1990s. Its perception of 
the world and organization remained large-
ly the same during that period. The directive 
issued by Deng Xiaoping immediately after 
the Tiananmen Incident was put to the test by 
drastic changes in the world that took place 
thereafter. In late 1992 the directive took the 
form of the policy mentioned above. Jiang Ze-
min had only to follow these prearranged pol-
icies. A proverb in America says: "If it ain't 
broke, don't fi x it." Jiang Zemin, having taken 
top position, had no power to correct even a 
gaping problem if one arose. Thus, continuity 
of Chinese foreign policy resulted.
3.2 Jiang Zemin's Foreign Policy
Deng Xiaoping died in February 1997. 
Contrary to the predictions of some experts 
for a revolt in the whole country, no such dis-
turbance happened and international affairs 
surrounding China underwent a peaceful 
transition. In particular, the China-U.S. rela-
tions, which had been deteriorating on and 
off since the Clinton administration, remark-
ably improved following the September 11 in-
cident in 2001. As for relations with Japan, 
there was a sign of recurrence of the "his-
toric problem" when Jiang Zemin visited Ja-
pan in late November 1998, but the situation 
has been improving since then. More recent-
ly, China is actively approaching not only to 
neighboring countries including Russia and 
those in Southeast Asia, but also countries in 
Europe, Central Asia, Africa and South and 
Central America. This gives the impression 
that the "omnidirectional diplomacy" pro-
posed by Deng Xiaoping and Qian Qichen 
has fi nally bloomed. No doubt these improve-
ments in foreign policy are backed by the de-
velopment of economic interdependence.
In this section, I will analyze how Ji-
ang Zemin took the leadership in foreign re-
lations before and after the death of Deng 
Xiaoping and how he interpreted Deng's ba-
sic directives and implemented them as actual 
policies. The conclusions in this section can 
be outlined in advance as follows:
(1) Jiang Zemin did not alter the 16-word Di-
rective as a framework of foreign policy. Ji-
ang held up the "fl ag of Deng Xiaoping" in 
regards to foreign policy and used his po-
sition as Deng's successor as a basis for au-
thority.
(2) Jiang Zemin took the lead in forming an 
organization and personnel arrangement 
who were to fulfi ll Deng's directives. He 
built, in his own style, an organization and 
personnel network in relation to the for-
eign policy.
(3) Jiang Zemin entrusted Zhu Rongji with 
economic issues and he himself chose to 
specialize in the administration of the Par-
ty. Economic reform had a high risk of fail-
ing.
(4) Consequently, this division of labor 
worked effectively. Jiang Zemin left to Zhu 
the fi nancial and administrative reforms 
which were likely to face domestic opposi-
tion, while involving himself in top-level di-
plomacy and ideology and education cam-
paigns, thus maintaining continuously his 
position as the leading fi gure and the top 
policymaker of China.
Now look at the characteristics of Jiang 
Zemin's approach towards foreign policies.
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3.2.1 The Establishment of Personal 
Leadership
First of all, when and how did Jiang es-
tablish his leadership in foreign policy? As 
seen in the previous section, the main weak 
point in the transition of power from Deng 
to Jiang was the problem of leadership in the 
military. For Jiang, the turning point came 
earlier than expected. In March 1993, First 
Vice-President of the Central Military Com-
mission, Yang Shangkun, and Secretary Gen-
eral, Yang Baibing were dismissed, and Liu 
Haoging and Zhang Zhen, who were close-
ly trusted by Deng, were inaugurated as Vice-
Presidents. At the same time, other than Chi 
Haotiau, who remained as a member of the 
Central Military Commission, Zhang Wann-
ian, Yu Yongbo, and Fu Quanyou were newly 
appointed as Members of the Central Military 
Commission. Thereafter, they occupied ma-
jor positions in the military under Jiang Zem-
in. The Jiang Zemin regime started at the mil-
itary center.
During the same period, Jiang became 
President in succession to Yang Shangkun, 
and Zeng Qinghong, who had been Jian's key 
intellect since the Shanghai period, was ap-
pointed as Director of Secretariats of the CPC 
(General Offi ce). Considering that Zeng was 
a rank-and-fi le member at that time, and the 
predecessor, Wen Jabao, was a Central Com-
mittee Member, this was an extremely unusual 
promotion. Zeng was also appointed as Secre-
tary of the Work Committee for Organs under 
Central Committee, and strived to build the 
Jiang regime. At the same time, the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, was in-
augurated as Vice-Premier of the State Coun-
cil with Li Lanqing, and the position of those 
in charge of foreign affairs was raised by one 
rank. In the Party, the aforementioned Head 
of the Publicity Department, Ding Guangen, 
Head of the United Front Work Department, 
Wang Zhaoguo, and Li Shuzheng of the In-
ternational Liaison Department were new-
ly appointed, and though the organizational 
framework in charge of foreign affairs estab-
lished by Deng was not changed, the member-
ship changed gradually.
Meanwhile a remarkable change was 
happening in several "leading small groups" 
in the center of the Party. Jiang Zemin started 
appointing his close associates to these small 
groups. For details of these Central Leading 
Groups, refer to Table 2. The division of work 
between Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji is ob-
vious at the central level. Further, Zeng Qin-
ghong, who was promoted to an Alternate 
Member of the Political Bureau at the same 
time as to a Central Committee Member in 
the 15th National Congress of the CPC in 
1997, became a member of the Central Lead-
ing Group in 1993 and 1994. Zeng was a rank-
and-fi le member at that time.
In regard to foreign policy, there are 
two points to note here. First, Jiang Zemin was 
inaugurated as the head of the Central Lead-
ing Group for Taiwan Affairs in January 1994. 
With Qian Quichen as Deputy Head, the line-
up strongly suggested that Jiang Zemin's fi rst 
task in foreign policy would be Taiwan affairs. 
In fact, Jiang Zemin proposed an "eight-point 
proposal for the peaceful unity of China" in 
January 1995. It gave the impression at home 
and abroad that it was Jiang Zemin who took 
the responsibility for China's new policy to-
wards Taiwan. (Ijiri [1997,75]) Chinese pol-
icy towards Taiwan hardened after Taiwan's 
Li Denghui administration turned down the 
proposal and President Li Denghui visited the 
United States in 1995. After the so-called Tai-
wan Straits Crisis in March 1996, Chinese-Tai-
wanese and Chinese-American relations set-
tled down. Taiwan affairs, however, remain 
the biggest issue in Chinese-American rela-
tions. In other words, the person in charge of 
Taiwan affairs virtually takes the initiative in 
foreign relations. Therefore, it is necessary to 
monitor who will be the Head of the Leading 
Group for Taiwan Affairs after the 16th Na-
tional Congress of the CPC.
Secondly, Jiang Zemin was inaugurat-
ed as the Head of Leading Group for Foreign 
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Affairs relatively recently in June 1998. Zhu 
Rongji was appointed as deputy at the same 
time. The group may well be one of the cen-
tral organs which is the most directly involved 
in foreign policy. As mentioned above, Li 
Peng was in offi ce as the Head of the Group 
from 1989 until Jiang Zemin took his place. 
Then Qian Quichen and Wu Xueqian were 
Deputy Heads. Judging from the line-up, the 
function of the group might have been to 
guarantee the continuity of Deng Xiaoping's 
directives. The position as Head of the Group 
might have enabled Li Peng, who was los-
ing infl uence within the party in spite of be-
ing No.2, to desperately protect his interests 
by exercising a kind of veto. In any case, it was 
more than one year after Deng Xiaoping's 
death and half a year after the 15th National 
Congress of the CPC that Jiang Zemin could 
display his own initiatives.
What kind of initiatives did Jiang Zem-
in try in his foreign policy? First, let me intro-
duce the latest views of Chinese governmental 
research institutes. The report titled "Inter-
national Strategy and Evaluation of Safety" by 
the China Institute of Contemporary Inter-
national Relations, states as follows in regard 
to Chinese diplomatic strategy from 2001 to 
2002 (Lu [2002, 254-272]):
(1) China promoted multipolarity against the 
unilateralism by the U.S. Specifi cally, China 
consistently opposed America's Missile De-
fense Plans. China established the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization in June 
2001, and China, Russia and central Asian 
countries confi rmed the diversity of civiliza-
tions and opposed hegemonism, China also 
defeated America's anti- Chinese human 
Table 2  Leading Small Groups at the Party Center (as of 2002)
Central leading small group for Taiwan affairs Central leading small group for Party organization
chair
vice chair
vice chair
vice chair
vice chair
member
Hu Jintao
Li Lanqing
Wei Jianxing
Zhang Quanjing
Zheng Keyang
Zeng Qinghong
1994
1994
1994
1999.3
1999.11
1994.6
Central leading small group for foreign affairs
Central leading small group for financial and economic
affairs
Central leading small group for propaganda and ideology
Central leading small group for village affairs
Source: Radiopress, China Directory 2003.
chair
vice chair
vice chair
chief secretary
secretary
vice secretary
Jiang Zemin
Zhu Rongji
Qian Qichen
Liu Shuqing
Liu Huaqiu
Lu Fengding
1998.6
1998.6
1989.12
1989.12
1994.12
1999.12
chair
vice chair
member
member
member
member
member
chief secretary
vice secretary
vice secretary
vice secretary
Zhu Rongji
Wu Bangguo
Zou Jiahua
Chen Jinhua
Liu Zhongli
Zhou Zhengqing
Jiang Chunyun
Wen Jiabao
Zeng Peiyan
Hua Jianmin
Ma Zhongchen
1994
1994.11
1994.11
1994.11
1994.11
1994.11
1994.11
1993.3
1993.2
1998.4
2000.10 
vice chair
member
vice chair
vice chair
chair
vice chair
Wang Maolin
Zeng Qinghong
Bo Yibo
Deng Liqun
Wen Jiabao
Ma Zhongchen
1999.3
1993.1
1990.3
1990.8
1998
2000.10
chair
vice chair
chief secretary
member
member
member
member
Jiang Zemin
Qian Qichen
Zeng Qinghong
Wang Daohan
Xiong Guangkai
Xu Yongyao
Chen Yunlin
1994.1
1994.1
2000.10 
1995.9
1996.2
1998.5
1998.5
Title Name date
Title Name date
Title Name date
Title Name date
Title Name date
Title Name date
Title Name date
Central leading small group for Party history
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rights proposals at the United Nations.
(2) China dealt appropriately and calmly with 
diffi cult incidents between China and the 
U.S. The emergency landing of the U.S. re-
connaissance plane did not damage China's 
national statue.
(3) After the terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
on September 11, China promptly joined 
the international anti-terrorism actions. Ji-
ang Zemin made a phone call to President 
Bush, promising his support for anti-terror-
ism efforts, soon after the attacks. China 
held an APEC summit meeting in Shanghai 
in November 2001, and adopted an anti-
terrorism resolution. As a result, President 
Bush promised to work towards a construc-
tive partnership with China.
(4) In regard to Taiwan affairs, China re-
gained its initiative. The Bush administra-
tion sold huge amount of weapons to Tai-
wan in April 2001. But the U.S. now seek 
China's cooperation in anti-terorism cam-
paigns. The U.S. become less aggressive in 
its policy towards Taiwan.
(5) The Chinese economy continued to grow. 
It raised the status of China internationally.
Undoubtedly, all of the above are no 
small diplomatic achievements. But is was 
Deng Xiaoping who built a foundation of 
these policies. Jiang's measures do not deviate 
from the direction of the Qian Report pub-
lished in 1992. Regarding to economic devel-
opment, China in 2002 is surely much rich-
er and much more powerful than it was in 
1992. However, the person who contribut-
ed to these good results was not Jiang Zem-
in, but Zhu Rongji. Since 2002, Jiang Zemin 
took charge of politics, while Zhu Rongji took 
charge of the economy.
3.2.2 Jiang Zemin's Foreign Policy
What changes has Jiang Zemin brought 
in China's foreign policy? The major points 
are reviewed as follows.
(1) The conceptualization of Deng Xiaoping's 
Judgement
As mentioned before, Deng Xiaop-
ing's 16-word Directive originated in the crisis 
just after the Tiananmen Incident. Deng was 
a genuine realist and not concerned much 
about creating political slogans. Jiang Zemin 
is different. The Jiang administration has dis-
seminated many slogans across China. Some 
of those slogans were about foreign policy.
Let me discuss two examples here. 
First, Jiang editted Deng's 16-word Directive 
and gave it a broader interpretation. Deng's 
16-word Directive became an offi cial guide-
line of China's foreign policy. Deng's judge-
ment represents the current consensus 
among the Chinese people. The 16-word Di-
rective as an offi cial slogan, however, has con-
cealed differences of opinion about China's 
foreign policy. For example, Li Shenzi, who 
served as Vice-President of the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Science and had the support of 
progressive intellectuals in the 1980s, quot-
ed Deng's 24-word Directive in a recent ar-
ticle. According to Li, Deng's Directive, that 
is, "observe calmly, respond carefully, stand 
fi rmly, behave wisely, do not stand out, act de-
cisively" (Li [2000, 4]), indicates that Chi-
na should pursue cooperative relations with 
the United States despite many confronta-
tions and disputes between the two countries. 
On the other hand, the report prepared by 
the China Institute of Contemporary Inter-
national Relations, quotes a slightly different 
24-word Directive. In the report, the directive 
is "observe calmly, stand fi rmly, behave wisely, 
defend tightly, do not stand out, act decisive-
ly" (Lu [2002, 258-259]). According to this re-
port, China should take much more cautious 
stance towards the U.S. than that of Li Shen-
zi.
Second, slogans often do not refl ect re-
ality and tend to get out of control. One ex-
ample is "constructive strategic partnership," 
a slogan declared by Jiang Zemin during his 
visit to the U.S. in October 1997. As the U.S.-
China joint statement on October 29 shows 
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clearly, the "constructive strategic partner-
ship" is just a target which both states should 
make efforts to achieve, and does not mean 
that such partnership had existed between 
them. In the offi cial text, a conditional clause, 
"both countries will make concerted efforts 
to establish the relationship" was inserted be-
fore the main sentence of "constructive stra-
tegic partnership" (Fan [1998, 4]). But when 
Jiang's visit to the U.S. became a symbol of 
good U.S.-Chinese relations, the condition-
al clause was often forgotten. Chinese peo-
ple felt as if the national power of China were 
now equal to that of the U.S. Needless to say, 
such exaggeration was another side of China's 
smoldering antipathy towards the U.S. (Song 
and Zhang et al. [1996]). Misunderstanding 
did more harm than good to its real foreign 
policy. 
(2) The emphasis on summit diplomacy
Deng Xiaoping liked to go abroad. He 
lived in France as a student worker when he 
was young. In the early 1960s, Deng visited 
Moscow and debate with Khrushchev. Deng's 
visits to the U.S. and Japan were both diplo-
matic breakthroughs. Present Chinese leaders 
often let their children study abroad, follow-
ing Deng's example. 
Since Jiang Zemin became the top lead-
er, Chinese leader's foreign visits have in-
creased remarkably. Generally speaking, it is 
not a bad thing for a head of state to visit for-
eign countries. As Jiang's visit to the U.S. in 
1997 indicates, a summit meeting is an effec-
tive means to give the impression of improved 
relationships between two countries, both at 
home and abroad. Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. 
in May 2002 was signifi cant in that the next 
head of China met U.S. leaders. Zhu Rongji 
visited the U.S. in April 1999 to discuss Chi-
na's accession to the WTO, which represents 
an example of a visit to discuss a specifi c is-
sue. 
However, frequent visits to foreign 
countries do not necessarily mean improved 
quality of diplomacy. In China, the secret di-
plomacy between Zhou Enlai and Richard 
Nixon is generally cited as a successful diplo-
macy. What Chinese diplomacy needs now is 
perhaps more openness. Closed-door diplo-
macy may not help much in this regard. Was 
it necessary for Jiang Zemin to visit the Unit-
ed States in October 2002? If the 16th Nation-
al Congress of the CPC had been postponed 
for two months just to hold this meeting, the 
cost of summit diplomacy was too much. Chi-
na cannot afford to leave alone mounting 
problems for two months.
(3) Commitment to regionalism
China joined the Asia Pacifi c Corpo-
ration (APEC) in 1991 and participated in 
peace-keeping operations of the U.N. (PKO) 
in Cambodia in that year. China attended the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and 
participated in ASEAN as an observer. It was 
not until recently, however, that China posi-
tively committed itself to these regional activ-
ities. China could have just "observed calm-
ly, stood fi rmly and played for time without 
standing out" according to Deng's 16-word Di-
rective. China could not afford to be exclud-
ed from the regional community. 
Since 1997, China has begun to make 
aggressive efforts to engage in regionalism. 
Multiple elements are likely to have driven 
the country to make such a move. First, Deng 
Xiaoping passed away, which enabled Jiang 
Zemin to establish his own diplomatic initia-
tives. Second, Hong Kong was returned to the 
country, which allowed China to forge mul-
tilateral relationships with Southeast Asia. In 
the same year when the fi nancial crisis struck 
Asia, China remained unaffected, and could 
elevate its international status. Furthermore, 
China may be intending to counteract Tai-
wan's infl uence and exclude U.S. infl uence in 
the region by engaging in regionalism aggres-
sively.
In 2001, China served as the host coun-
try for the APEC Summit Meeting in Shang-
hai and established the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, and in 2002, it advocated 
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free trade zones for "ASEAN +3." China has 
greatly committed itself to regionalism in re-
cent years. This should be welcome since the 
U.S. and Japan have long been arguing that 
China should join the international commu-
nity. The problem is that China regards such 
regionalism as a major means to expand its 
interests in the region and tends to utilize it 
to improve its international status (Lu [2002, 
262-264]). Such tendency might be inevita-
ble when a country begins to commit itself to 
global affairs. However, China needs to un-
derstand that merely a veneer of engagement 
in regionalism would result in extremely lim-
ited returns.
3.3 Foreign Policy after the 16th Na-
tional Congress
What shift might the 16th National 
Congress of the CPC bring in Chinese for-
eign policy? If the above analysis is correct, 
the range of shifts is unlikely to be large. Chi-
na's new leaders are expected to follow Deng 
Xiaoping's Directive and fi ne-tune individual 
approaches in light of changing internation-
al circumstances. It would take the new lead-
er, currently Hu Jintao, a long time to inject 
his own ideas into foreign policy. The implica-
tions of the 16th Partyl Congress of the CPC 
are reviewed below in terms of basic guide-
line, organization and practical policy.
3.3.1 Basic Guideline
Was Deng Xiaoping's 16-word Direc-
tive still valid after the recent National Con-
gress? Yes, but with qulifi cations. Jiang Zemin 
says in the fi rst section of his political report, 
"Past fi ve year's efforts and 13 years' basic ex-
periences," that China entered a new phase 
in diplomatic policy; he sings his own prais-
es, saying that China conducted bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy effectively, engaged 
in international exchanges positively, and im-
proved China's status in the global communi-
ty (Jiang [2002, 4]). In respect of the 16-word 
Directive, Jiang says that China should address 
international affairs, respect cultural diversity 
of the world, and promote democratization in 
international relations through "the policy of 
calm observation and careful response." Jiang 
also stresses that China will put aside differ-
ences while common ground is being sought 
in order to achieve a peaceful international 
environment and to establish favorable rela-
tionships with its neighboring nations" (Jiang 
[2002, 10]).
Deng's Directive, which initially consist-
ed of 12 words, evolved into the 16-word Di-
rective and into the 24-word Directive later, 
then fi nally settled into the 8-word Directive. 
The last half of the 16-word Directive, "do 
not stand out, behave wisely, and act decisive-
ly," has clearly become outdated. This indi-
cates that the basic foreign policy of China 
has been shifting gradually from crisis preven-
tion in the political system, which was Deng 
Xiaoping's major concern, to international 
cooperation. This shift has, however, just be-
gun. Jiang's new Directive such as a ?spirit of 
putting aside differences while seeking a com-
mon ground? and ?respecting cultural diver-
sity of the world? has not been tested by histo-
ry yet. While Deng's 16-word Directive passed 
through historic ordeals such as the Gulf War 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
China is unlikely to give up the core of 
Deng's 16-word Directive, "observe calmly and 
respond carefully," for a long time in the fu-
ture. This is because the likelihood of a minor 
or signifi cant crisis is expected to grow even 
though the possibility of war has diminished 
(Liu [2002, 5-7]). As a matter of fact, when 
the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia was mistak-
enly bombed by a U.S. jet fi ghter, Li Shenzi 
quoted the 16-word Directive and maintained 
that China should respond calmly to the is-
sue.  
Will the "Three Represents" which the 
16th National Congress adopted as a signif-
icant thought, replace Deng's directive? In 
terms of foreign policy, this is unlikely. The 
"Three Represents" shows only what the Com-
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munist Party of China should be; the ideal of 
the Party. So far, the party does not represent 
"Advanced forces of production, Advanced 
culture, and Primary interests of Chinese peo-
ple." The "Three Represents" is reported to 
give an opportunity for private entrepreneurs 
to join the CPC. But such people have not 
been elected even as an Alternate Member of 
the Central Committee yet. It will be a long 
time before representatives of private busi-
ness to take part in the central government in 
China. It will also take a very long time before 
they exert infl uence on China's foreign poli-
cy, which is still determined by an extremely 
limited number of people.
The signifi cance of the "Three Repre-
sents" lies not in its contents but in its symbol-
ic effects. As the "Three Represents" has been 
stated in the party platform as an important 
thought, the "Four Principles" (Path to Social-
ism, People's dictatorship, Leadership of the 
Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought) have not been advocat-
ed recently as had been stressed many times 
since the Tiananmen Incident. While the 
"Four Principles" are waning now, the "Three 
Represents" are showing more. Chinese intel-
lectuals describe this trend as "Four (Princi-
ples) go and Three (Represents) enter." 
3.3.2 Organization
It might be too early to declare at this 
point that Jiang Zemin has stepped down 
from the political arena or will do so in the 
near future. The process and the selection 
of personnel appointments has been hidden 
from the public. The question remains why 
China, which is trying to democratize its at-
titudes in international relations, had to re-
shape its organization in such a secretive way. 
Who will take over Deng's policies if Jiang 
completely steps down? Hu Jintao, who be-
came a Standing Committee Member of the 
Political Bureau ten years ago, has only lim-
ited experience in foreign affairs. Another 
name could be Zeng Qinghong, but he has 
also limited experience.
Although it remains to be seen how Ji-
ang maintains his grip on power, the latest 
personnel appointments inside the Commu-
nist Party indicate that a transfer of power to 
the younger generation is happening. Deng 
Xiaoping had direct contacts with foreign 
VIPs even after his retirement, and he stood 
as No.2 only behind Jiang at the podium of 
the 1989's National Anniversary. We must re-
member, however, that Deng was the kind of 
a person who always liked to put himself be-
hind the scenes. Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, 
and Jiang Zemin took charge of political re-
ports between the Twelfth and Fourteenth 
National Congresses of the CPC when Deng's 
infl uence was still strong. Deng let his hand-
picked subordinates take offi cial duty (see Ta-
ble 1). In contrast to Deng, Jiang Zemin likes 
to keep a high profi le himself. Indeed, he 
read a political report by himself taking Hu 
Jintao's place in the last National Congress.
As Jiang Zemin's statue remains unclear, 
there arises the problem as to who makes the 
fi nal decision on foreign policies. In other 
words, power struggle between Jiang and Hu 
may occur. Jiang might transfer his power to 
Zeng Qinghong, but this too would cause a 
confl ict between Hu and Zeng. Until the real 
leader of the party steps out, the composition 
of the Leading Small Group cannot be decid-
ed. The power shift will have a tremendous 
impact on the Leading Small Group for For-
eign Affairs (see Table 2). It is unlikely that Ji-
ang, Zhu, and Qian all quit at once. The ques-
tion is, who among the three will remain in 
power, and at what position? The same can 
be said regarding the Leading Small Group 
for Taiwan Affairs. The problem of this group 
is greater than the Leading Small Group for 
Foreign Affairs. The Leading Small Group 
for Taiwan Affairs is aging. Wang Daohan has 
been the chief negotiator for the Chinese 
government on China-Taiwan affairs. Wang, 
now 89, was from the New Fourth Army which 
fought against Japanese troops mainly in cen-
tral China during the Sino-Japan war. When 
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in Shanghai, he was Jiang Zemin's boss and 
introduced Jiang to the central government. 
The generation shift in the Leading Small 
Group for Taiwan Affairs seems to be inevi-
table. Will China be able to carry out drastic 
change in such an organization?
In contrast with the Party organizations, 
the reshuffl e in the government's foreign af-
fairs section appears to be going smoothly. 
The government has succeeded in churning 
out young offi cials competent in dealing with 
foreign matters. Wu Yi, who has been promot-
ed to offi cial member of the Political Bureau 
of the Communist Party from its Alternate 
Member, is thought to be in charge of foreign 
affairs for the government. She has also been 
promoted to Vice-Premier from State Coun-
cilor, although not elected to become a Stand-
ing Committee Member of the Political Bu-
reau in the party. As for Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, two names are circulated. One is Li 
Zhaoxing, former ambassador to the United 
States, and the other is Dai Bingguo, Head of 
the International Liaison Department. Anoth-
er source says the incumbent Minister, Tang 
Jianxuan, will remain in the seat. Whatever 
happens, the government's diplomatic policy 
will not be greatly affected. 
3.3.3 Policies
The political report announced at the 
16th National Congress of the CPC lists up 
targets but lacks details. One point in the re-
port concerning the policy toward Taiwan is 
worth noting. Jiang's report basically follows 
his predecessors' attitudes toward Taiwan, 
but has listed up the content China is will-
ing to talk in the dialogue with Taiwan "under 
the condition of One China" (Jiang's Report 
2002, 45):
(1) China can negotiate the termination of 
hostilities across the Taiwan Strait
(2) China can negotiate Taiwan's status in in-
ternational society and its operating fi elds 
in economic, cultural, and social areas in 
accordance with its status.
(3) China can negotiate political status of Tai-
wan's government and so on.
What do these so-called "Three New 
Phrases" imply? They are not likely to impress 
Taiwan's leadership. It is the notion of "One 
China" that President Chen Shubian and the 
leaders of Democratic Progressive Party have 
opposed, and so it would be naive to think 
that "New Three Phrases" will break the ice 
and lead to the resumption of dialogue be-
tween both sides of the Strait. But why did Ji-
ang announce the New Three Phrases at this 
timing?
Along with the "Three Represents" in-
troduced at the 16th National Congress was 
the phrase "yo-ji-gu-sin" which means to "keep 
pace with the times". This new term suggests 
that he felt a strong need to refresh old pol-
icy. If Jiang put the "Three Represents" poli-
cy into practice (although there is little such 
possibility at present), the differences be-
tween the Chinese Communist Party and 
Koumintang Party (Taiwanese National Par-
ty) may diminish in the end. Jiang might have 
wanted to show his leadership regarding Tai-
wan. He might wish to retain sway over Tai-
wanese affairs after his retirement. Retaining 
infl uence over Taiwan affairs means keeping 
relations with Japan and the U.S. Perhaps this 
scenario is what he meant by "keeping pace 
with the times".
Conclusion: Pending Problems for 
the Seventeenth National Con-
gress
The 16th National Congress of the CPC 
was the fi rst and the last opportunity for Ji-
ang to show his true colors. At the 15th Na-
tional Congress of the CPC held after Deng's 
death, Jiang decided to hoist the fl ag of Deng 
Xiaoping. Zhu Rongii put the Socialist Mar-
ket Economy into practice.The most notable 
characteristics of this post-Deng era are the 
collaborations between Jiang and Zhu.
As noted already, after Deng's death in 
1997, Jiang started showing his own colors in 
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foreign affairs. Jiang changed the style of di-
plomacy from careful observation to outgoing 
actions. But he changed little in substance. Ji-
ang met with many foreign VIPs in and out 
China, held various international conferenc-
es in his country, and pursued diplomacy in 
all directions as Deng had never done before. 
The Party organizations supported Jiang be-
cause under Jiang the party could enjoy great-
er infl uence in foreign policy.
The next fi ve years before the 17th Na-
tional Congress will be the period Deng's Di-
rective faces serious tests. There are two chal-
lenges. The fi rst is a peaceful and smooth 
transfer of power in foreign affairs. In other 
words, it is still unclear as to how deeply Jiang 
will interfere with the process of political de-
cision-making. The lack of detailed informa-
tion on the composition and function of the 
Central Leading Small Group is another fac-
tor. Hu Jintao needs a long time to establish 
fi rm political leadership. Confusion and the 
power struggles in the central political arena 
will pose a grave threat to China in case of an 
unpredicted crisis.
The second challenge is the economy. 
As we have seen, the succession from Deng to 
Jiang happened when China achieved near-
ly 9% annual growth. Jiang could strengthen 
his grip on central power for 13 years, while 
Zhu Rongii took charge of economic affairs. 
Is Hun Jintao able to control his Party and 
country hand in hand with Premier Wen Jian-
bao? Are they able to deal with the problems 
with full consideration of economic setbacks? 
Will China face trade friction between Japan 
and the U.S. as they did before? The future 
leaders of China have a heavy burden to carry 
on their shoulders.
(Yoshifumi NAKAI)
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